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IN THE SUPRE.MEtCOURT 
OF _THE 
STATE 0-F UTAH 
HARRY WALTE-RS and 
BETTY W ALTE~RS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
ROBERT W. BRAND,T, 
Administrator of the Estate of 
BarbaTa Best Pelly, appointed in Utah, 
Defendwnt and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9880 
BRIE-F OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMgNT OF THE KIND· OF CASE 
Defendant and Appellant appeals to the Supreme 
'Oourt of Utah from a jury verdict entered in the District 
Court of Sevier County, August 17, 19'62, and the denial 
of -Defendant's Motion for Nerw Trial. Plaintiffs were 
awarded damages for personal injuries and property 
damages resulting from an .automobile accident August 
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22., 1953, involving a pickup truC!k driven by Plaintiff 
Harry Walters and in which his wife, Betty Walters, was 
a passenger, and an automob[ie approaching fro·m the 
opposite direction driven by Barbara B~st Pelly, who 
was killed in the ·~ccident and for whose estate the ad-
ministrator was appointed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
D·efendant filed a timely motion for new trial which was 
denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and Respondents seek to have the judg-
ment affirmed. · 
STATEMENT OF F AC:TS 
August 22, 1953, at approximately 5:15 o'cloc:k, p.m., 
on U. S. Highway 89 in Sevier Co-unty, Utah, ·a 1953 
Chevrolet automobile driven northerly by deceased, Bar-
bara Best Pelly, and a 1953 Chevrolet pickup driven 
southerly in the opposite direction by Plaintiff and Re--
spondent Harry Walters, and in which his wife, Plaintiff 
Betty W:alters_, was a passenger, collided. 
The collision was head-on for all practical purposes~ 
the right front "corner" (R-211, Line 22) of the Walters 
vehicle meeting the right f'ront "just ahead of the door 
standard on the right side ... " (R-208, Line 22) (Photos, 
Exhibit 5 ofPelly vehicle, Exhibit 6 of Walters vehicle), 
as the latter vehicle, the Pelly vehicle angled "30 to 40° 
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angle to the roadway ... " (R-208, Line 12) across the 
highway into the opposing lane of travel. 
· The point of impact was fiour feet from the center 
of- Plaintiff's and Respondents' side of ·the highway; on 
Defendant's wrong side of the highway. (R-212, Line 2) 
Plaintiff Harry Walters testified that .as he ap-
proached the bridge, the scene of the accident, he was 
on "my own side" of the street (R-109, Line 21) (R-110, 
Line 14), and that he had been since leaving Aurora ex-
cept for passing one car passed earlier (R-124, Line 24, 
30; R-125, L;ine 5); that he " ... saw dust made by the 
car," (R-111, Line 18) on the shoulder of the highway 
beyond the bridge "about 130 yards away from me" 
(R-112, Line 17), Plaintiff Harry Walters marking the 
Plaintiff's map Exhibit 3 (R-115, Line 6) where the dust 
arose, said point being where the physical evidence of 
tire tracks revealed the Pelly car for some reason, control 
or otherwise, was off the shoulder (officer's testimony, 
R-179, Line 20) It's speed was such that the Walters 
vehicle, itself traveling forty-five miles per hour (R-108, 
Line 21) was knocked backward ten feet (R-188, Line 
7), su:ffic,-ient that shortly before it passed a vehicle going 
in the same direction between forty-five and fifty (R-144, 
Line 13), that of the witness Averett, got ahead of the 
Averett automobile by one mile .at one time and 1{ept 
ahead of the Averett vehicle going "around that mileage 
[50]" (R-147, Line 20), Averett, however, having told the 
officer he was going the maximum (sixty miles per hour), 
when passed by the Pelly vehicle (R-201, Line 126). Then 
the Pelly automobile "veered sharply off the road so the 
wheels got off the shoulder there and it made a sharp 
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turn and shot across the bridge." (R-145, Line 21) (In 
the words of the witness Averett.) Contrary to the state'" 
ment uf fact in Defendant's brief, Page 3, Paragraph 3, 
Averett could not testify as to the position of the Pl:ain-
tiff Walters' vehicle at the time of the impact, Averett 
not being ·able to see the Walters' vehicle. (R-156, Line 7) 
Q. At the time the car collided were you able to 
see the pickup truck~ 
A. No, sir. 
(roso R-146, Line 23) 
Q But at that point you couldn't see the Walte'rs 
car~ 
A. That's true. 
The witness Averett testified (R-151, L·ine 7) he 
could see no ind:iication of any marks left by the Pelly 
car, though the highway patrolman, Ted Hansen, caTe-
fully charted same (R-179·, Page· 18) and they appeared 
on the photographs. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 
witne·ss A vere~tt testified indicating he worried over 
marks on the highw·ay under the pickup after same had 
come to rest and after he had gone to summon help 
(R-159, Line 18); these marks were determined by the 
patrolman to " ... not pertain to either of the two vehicles 
involved in this accident." (R-186, Line 15) 
Ave'rett, however, 0ontended had there been any such 
mar:ks from the Pelly ;car he would have seen them. 
(R-165, Line 21) 
As to the witness Roberts' testimony concerning a 
third car being passed by the Pl:aintiff Walters and 
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which supposedly stopped at the scene of the accident, 
the witness Averett saw none and detailed that he saw 
;none though in a position to see. (R-157, Line 19) 
Q. How long was it after you left the scene that 
you returned~ 
A. Long enough for the ambulance to come from 
Salina because it passed me in that mile he-
tween Aurora and the accident. 
Q. Just prior to the time that you saw this dust 
you indicate two to three ·car lengths south of 
the bridge, had any other car- did you ob-
serve any other southbound cars~ 
A. No, sir, not that I can remember. 
Q. Did you o hserve whether or not - well from 
your position could you observe any cars that 
were ·approaching from the southbound from 
the north side of the bridge~ , 
A. No. 
Q. Was your visibility obstructed in any way~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. As you approached the bridg-e the cars cOin-
ing from the north, it would be on north of 
the bridge~ 
A. To make that :curve and drop over you couldn't 
see over that bridge, at least I couldn't. .All 
I could see was the Pelly car. 
This third motorist, if there was one, was never 
produced at trial. Roberts' testimony generally is con-
trary to, and not sustained by, the physical evidence as 
outlined by the investigating 10<fficer who placed the point 
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of impact on Plaintiff W·alters' side of the road (Exhibit 
3, marked with X) (R-185, Line 13), within a foot of 
the center of Walters' lane of travel (R-207, Line 21, 
Line 30, and R-212, Line 3) with unmistakable marks 
from the Pelly car leading from off its right shoulder 
.of ·the road, diagonally a;cross the road to its wrong side, 
and with no marks discernible from the Walters vehicle 
except side skid marks made after impact. (R-185, Liners 
21 to 30) 
A. Well, at the time. we were making a recheck 
there were numerous short stopping marks 
made by different vehicles that had eome to 
the scene. We found a very short mark made 
up to the point of rest of the W·alters' piek:-up, 
which showed a side s:k:i!d as the car was turn-
ing after the impact. Other than that there 
were no discern-able marks a.s to the tire mak-
ing marks from the Walters' pick-up other 
than from markings that evidently that were 
made from ·the front wheels as it was pushed 
s1de-ways and around a,t the point of impact. 
(R-207, Lines 20 to 30) 
A. Now ·at a point twenty-four feet north of the 
bridge, and four feet west . of center line is 
this point of a variation in the travel of this 
· curvature to indicate something causing it 
· definitely to quickly change its movement .and 
. that';s.where this other side sJ]ridding:,/I assume, 
and deduct~d, came from the impact and mov-
ing sideways of the front wheels of the two 
· vehicles, ·so that that would be four feret less 
to the center line and twenty-four feet south 
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of the north - from the north edge of the 
bridge, you see. 
(R-212, Lines 16 to 19) 
A. No, I didn't make a measurement. I just re-
call there was distance enough from the point 
of impact that I felt it had no conne~ction with 
either of these vehicles. 
(R-218, Lines 17 to 21) 
T~HE COURT: His testimony is to the effect that 
he observed no marks there on his fi.Tst inves-
tigation. Late~r on there were these well de--
fined skid marks 'Or brake marks, call them 
wha£ you please that he noticed, of course, 
in the opposite lane or the right lane of the 
highway. 
(R-22,5, Line 30, R-226, Lines 1-3) 
Q. Just one more - Could I have you step to 
the board and show me where you saw the 
other heavy tire marks1 
A. I don't recall at present of the proximity but 
they weren't :close enough to be tied in. 
Plaintiff Betty Walters testified she did not drive, 
has never driven, that her husband owned and paid for 
the ·car she was in (R-23), that she was in the front seat 
beside her husband, that the other car weaved (R-51, 
Line ,2), that she then" ... thought they had it back under 
control. We thought they were going to pass us." Cross 
examination failed to ·show she was or could be a joint 
venturer and chargeable with negligence, if any, of heir 
hushand, Harry Walters. (R-70, 71) 
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S.TATE~MENT OF POINTS 
Thrut the ·Court did not commit prejudicial errors as 
alleged by Defendant in his Brief, Points I to VI ofDe-
fendant's Brief, and as indexed heretofore; . that the 
Defendant had a fair trial and that the _judgment should 
be affirmed. I 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANSWER. TO POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF, i.e. 
THAT THE OOURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION 
17 TO THE JURY, SAID INSTRUCTION BEING A VERDICT 
DIRECTING "('FORMULA} INSTRUCTION WHICH DID NOT 
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 'l'HE, DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF 
THE GAISE. 
The instruction is entirely co~rect as to Betty 
Walters who Gould not have been contriputJo,riJy negli-
gent, and, open~ td- little -criticism as to Plaintiff Harry 
Walters._ :·.,,; 
D~efendant-AppeUant at ·trial proposed no· instruc-
tion either covering damage·s or enumeratillg alleged 
grounds of negligence. Plaintiffs submitted an instruc-
tion' on each, Plaintiffs' requested instructions Nos. 11 
ad 15, each framed .according to JIFU fonns. The Court 
framed · an ·instruction. · covering both damages and 
enumerating possible· grounds of negligence, Instruction 
No. 17, ;punctuating the same with cautioning language 
such rus ". . . the plaintiffs have the burden of proving 
by a preponderanee . of the evidence one or more of the 
fo.Uowing .. ~" and "The plaintiff has the burden of 
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more of the acts or omis'Sions designated as A, B, C, D, 
an~ E was the efficient a;nd moving c1ause, which in a 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by arii!J new, 
independent cause produced the collision which resulted 
in the injuries. Except for a one-paragraph instruction, 
No. 16, three preceding instructions, 14, 15, and 15 (a) 
were Defendant's requests, proclaiming D·efe:ndant's 
theory; No. 14 instructing as to" ... hazard in the event 
another vehicle might :approach from the opposite direc-
tion and when the view is obstructed upon approaching 
within 100 feet of any bridge ... ," and that if "Harry 
Walters drove to the left of the center . . . as to create 
a hazard . . . then Harry Walters was negligent"; In-
struction No 15 cautioning that the fact of an accident 
does not justify a conclusion of negligence; and Instruc-
tion No. 15(a) detailing the grace extended to one con-
fronted with unexpected peril. The following instruction, 
No. 18, then detailed that if joint venture was found the 
"contributory neg}igence of the plaintiff, Harry Walters, 
is imputed to the plaintiff, Betty Walters, and she cannot 
recover." 
The foregoing would not all go on one page; it was 
read and subnritted together; and as given could not have 
but f-Ully apprised the jury of both Plaintiffs' ·and De-
fendant's theory of the case; it is not, in whole or in 
part, a formula instruction as that term is generally 
used to refer to :an instruction detailing and intending 
to detail conditions of recovery; -and c;an hardly be said, 
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as stated in Aprpelllant's Brief, Page- ·9~ to have "ignored 
completely the Defendant's theory and defense.:'' 
Ih ·the Morrison ·vs. :Perry case, 104 "Utah 151, 140 
P~ 2d ·772;· ~ited'bYA:pp:e11ant, the.Shpr~me Co~rt deais 
with an eil·ab~'rate ril.ne~qu~~hon in.struetib~, In~truction 
!· • . ~ _; • . I , , . . ··~ : " - ~ . . . :i :: . . , . . ' , :~ ; . ·. No: ·2; notes <it' to be incomplete; in' and of itself, and also 
errm~e6us and confu~ir~g,. direCting the jury to l asce,rtafu 
if certatn 'iten;_s ~.f ·~~glige~~~ were pr~sent, then asKing 
them to decide if, in fact, s~ch acts were :negligence, the 
Court saying: · ·· 
·, .' ,\ ' ~ . 
''The jury was told ·that if a person drove his 
·ear . in· a certain manner he was negligent, and 
also thai- if .he •.drove, his car. i:o, that manner they 
-w:ere then to determine whether. or not he. was 
:ri~gligent. Thus tlie ju:ry··was· _permitted to decide 
tha;t acts·. of negligence a~ a matter of law were 
not ·negligence. ·These ::instructions :were . cenffiet-
ing .and the giving of such instructiQ·P:~ ~:Il~.titutes 
error .. Sqr~~o·!" 1!s. Bell, 5;1 Utah .2~~t 170 f~ 7_2.'' 
·The Court cites th~ .. fQregoin.g e;rror ~nd at least 
fop.:r oth~r separate items as error.; Page 160, "The Court 
erred in instructing the•.· jury that .a constant .lookout 
would be required"; Page 164, "such examination was 
mis'eonduct on the part ro.f·:plaintiff's counsel and is re~ 
versiqle error,'~ referring to examination of j1;trors; Pag~ 
166, "Such questioning of the witness by plaintiff's eoun .. 
sel was misconduct , and . constitutes . · rever~ible error" 
referring to prejudiciaL manner,:of examinll;l.g witness; 
Page 167, "We.iconclude.!that an action for the recovery 
of :damages for the ·de~truetion:<>f personal property sur-
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vives.- . . . The court erred in sus·t3Jining the general 
demurrer"; two of these e·rrors being noted by the court, 
not just as error .. but "reversible error"; therefoTe, we 
wonder if the erroneous instruction above noted in M o·rri-
son vs. Per.ry womd have alone warranted the new trial, 
es-pe'Cially where the evidence was such that on the first 
hearing, Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 130, on the evi-
dence as revealed, the Supreme Court's impression was 
that, Page 143, "the trial court shohl<i nave granted de-
fendant's motion for dismissal at the close of plaintiff's 
testimony." 
Morrison v.s. Perry, Supra, cites with approval, 
Page 163, Toone vs. J. P. O'Neill Construction Co., 40 
Utah 265, 121 P. 10, where the eourt ~vreed defendant 
was entitled to have his theory of the case presented in 
the instructions, but held that this theory - that the 
party injured by blast selected the place he stood, thus 
assuming the risk- was adequately presented by the 
instruction, "If you find from the evidence that the plain-
tiff upon his own judgment uninfluenced by any assurance 
of safety on the part of defendant's foreman, as to 
whether or not the place he was standing at the time 
he fired the shot was safe, or if you find that the plain-
tiff selected the place but he fired the blast without di-
r~ctions or suggestions of defendant's foreman, then the 
defendant is not liable, and you should return a verdict 
for the defendant"; that though the ·court might have 
charged the jury differently the "appellant's theory of 
the evidence was sufficiently covered by what the court 
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told the jury, and hence if was·' 'no~t. pr'ejudiced by the 
court's·; modification refEh~red to.'' . 'I· ·. 
'. -. .- • I - -. / . • • :... ' ·• • ,: ." • •• ;· : •• ~ .t .. ~- .~: . •\ • . ' .. ~ I 
I pie vs. Richar:dson, .9 1Jta.h ?d 5, 336 }>. 2d 781, i13 
cited. i.n Appel1anfs. :Bfieft~ ~\lP'£.~rt· of the. s~e id~a. 
In~tr~ctiqn ~o .. 17 is· no,tieally:a f'~rm~~'·w~tructio11 as 
defined in .thruf cas~ beea:11Ee in .the same i~·s,f:nictio~~ the 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . \ : ~ . . .. .. . . .:. . . ' . . . . 
languag~ is. modifie~ py di~yussiq~ o~ "efficienfa.nd mo~­
i~g cau~e,". · ''·~o~tiD:u'o~~. ·~~g~~nce. unbrok~n by ·84ly ~ew 
indep.enge:U:t dau~e," :;tnd other i,tt,ngua,g~ · modifying, ~he 
sa~e. . :Even if it were as eo~s,tructed; it would 9:e: no 
grounds for a riew trial as to, ·Betty Walters and :woUld 
not besuff~cie:rit grounds.fora n.ew trial.as to the driver 
Harry· W.alhjrs';· and·Ivie v.;Richaridson··seeiill.S to make 
that ch~ar. The langliage in that case· is .. th~t.·su~4. ~n in-
strii~tio~ "}~ no·t generally a good fype ~f }nst:r:ucti~~ 'to 
' . ' ·' . · : ,'· • ·; " ~ · . :• . . ' ' . .' '. ' . ' .'· ' 1:: : '' ' I~ • • 
give," .(Page 11~ Paragraph 3), and although ·tll~· Coru;t 
notes that the same i~ in error. t~· that ext~t, ~the. 'court 
only found. reversible· ~rror after· noting wany other 
grieyous' ~rrors., (Page 12, P.ar~graph '1) ."~f ~~~e'_im­
port~n~~ is the e~ror ~ssigned · in giving instructi~u No: 
·io ~ . ':;'; (Page12~ :pa~~~raph·•2) ,;There ~re ·addi.h~npJ 
cir~st~~es. in the i~stant case that .are indic~ti~e ~:r 
the. fact .tha.t aJ~ir: trittl_ was not had- by th~ D·efend~t.';:; 
• : • ~ • ~ { • • ' < .: • •• :, :' ,< • : : • • • • • • } ' • • • 
.and.·~fhgrs .. Th,en the eou,rt reiterated ··a note it h~s fr~-
quen.tly. so.nnded, P:~g~ 13, Par.agraph. 3._: .. "The''·ri~r(}rs 
r t'' . · ' : ·. • ... · :· .. , ·. ' ' ' '.·, 1 . -rJ '·r' 
must be real and substantial and suc]l. as , may reaspn,-
.abiy.he ,suppo~~~d ~~·~ld affect' the _"r~esult.'' . ·. . ".. ., .. 
• ~ ' . ' I , ~ :' ~- • ~- .' ' • ' : 
Defenda:nt could have at. trial,· but· did not, submit 
or_ r,equest. speeial interrogatories,1eaviR&" .ihe. Court to 
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frame general .. instructions;. which it did, and the lan-
guage ·in Instruction 17, "unbroken by any new inde-
dendent cause,"= etc., was · as effective in modifying 
Inst-ruction·17 as would have"been the insertion of. such 
words as· "unleHs you also find contributory negligence 
on ·the part 'of Plaintiffs"; and the latter language was 
·unnecessary as· to Betty Walters and her cause of action 
and would have certainly rendered: Instruction 17 ac-
ceptable to the most critical as to Plaintiff Harry Walters 
and his cause of action. 
It does not seem reasonable that Instruction 17 must 
have, in order to convey its plain English meaning to 
eiglitintelligent men, also be interpolated with language 
on ilnm.ediate trazard where the··same is almost immed-
ui:tely previously oovered. 
In· n:~dd vs. 4irway Mo·tor Coach Lines, Inc., 104: 
Utah 9, 137 P. 2d 374, where a bus driver drove onto a 
la~ to ·avoid a bicyclist emerging from a driveway, the 
court ... said: 
"We are frank to say that some portions of 
· the instructions are not models, but the alleged 
:· incompleteness· ·of some instructions was covered 
· by giying :others. The cha;rge to the jury must be 
consi~er,ed as an !integral whole.· ... " 
.. :·.4,8tar~in vs., Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834, 
. the court, ~ nil!ing on an assignment of error in the 
instructions said : 
"It seems unnecessary and inadvisable to treat 
in detail the assigned errors telating to the. giving 
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' arid refusaJ. to give instruct~ons. The instructions 
-· ·should ·not be -susceptible of; :mis·eOlTSll"llGtion as 
· either·. emnnJ.e:p,ts .oru the· e:vide:n'G(f; Of'J,argum.en~s 
:for~~thyl; si~e ~fJ.h~ ease. It-w~~·the du;ty,ot the 
·! 2. • court t~ .CJ9!Y~r the theories ·of_ both: ~arti@s ;in ·his 
·instructions. 'Martineau v·s~·'Ha1is-O·#, 47: Utah {)49,, 
,, · · H>5"P~ :432_; :MeDonald ·v.:s·.~ ·'Union: Pac·if.ic R.· ·Oo;, 
.:~09 .~.Utah ,493, :J-67 P. .. 2d 6.85. ·If. the instr-uctions 
are •. ,<?,On$iqere.~; a~,:.'. a · wl,l.ole,. ·as ·they; m~y 1 he, 
w,alke:nhorst V$,. Ir esler, ~-2 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d 
.' '654; .R_e.dd vs.· Airway Mbtor. Cbach Lines~; 104 
Utah 9, 137 P~ 2d .37 4, the ·CJorurt ad~·quately dis.-
charged ·this duty and.fairly presented the issues 
-:: ···; : ·ta: tlie1 jury." . · · - · · · ··· · ·· 
f N ~ie that'Def~~d~t~i;i}~n~~t'-~seif-"sub~tt;d ~ 
~o~~alled. fo~t1fa' ins~~~ti.~~ D~fendant's .r~·qu~st~~· -~~ 
st;Jcflon No.' 1~( the· .'same' llO't' cont~Iting ~11' conditions 
. ; . ·.. . .. ·. ; : '';; l " '! ' . •· 1•. ' 
necessary to invoke the 0onclusion therein, that is/" ... 
then H·~ry Walters· was· n~glig~nt ~~!ld if yo-u find his 
nyglige-l}Ce.·w~s t;he proximate, cause of'the\collision~you 
must. -return .. a .verdict· in" :f'avor ·of tli~ "aefendant :·and 
agaihst < the. plain tiffs nOr. cause· of action'''; fror 'illi;tanee; 
one cqrtditiol1 necessary to make the sa#li.J~ntirely pal-
~t,a;ble wouJd. have ,p,e~n_ t~· ;a9:d, .")lowe~.eli; ·yo~Jp.ay ·still 
find .·in favor of· Plaintiff·oBe.tty, Wailter~~·--and•;against 
D·efendant unless yo-li' also· find the riegligenc~~ O:f Harry 
wauers to 'be llie .sole ,~-roximate qa,use o:ft1e ·aooident; 
ahd. \the· i~~t~clio~ eo~~d~ be,. further -~t~~r;~lat~d ·with 
language· on joint-venture, if-joint venture wa,s, an issue 
(and:~we· b~Heve it w~s- n~~t). This instruction; ·however, 
when ·:r·e~d With the in'~trugtiqn_s'a~ a whole, like Instruc-
,: .... :1C .. <- .. ;'_::7 .~.'y'.l'ltp,r, :·· ; ·.. ~~_.· ( ... • 
tiO'll lT;;t~ ~~read, CJQU~~noi.be misleading. . ~;;:.'t,~,~ 
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POINT II 
<ANSWER-·rro· APPELLANTS POINT--NO~-ll,'te. THAT 
THE COURT -ERRED IN RE-FUSING ,TO INSTRUCT THE 
JUR:X.- -IN __ ·AOCORD~NCE. WITH -pEFENDANT'S -RE-
QUESTED ~NS~:Jlll'~'!'ION NO. 13, ~ELA:rJNG _TO THE 
STA'.J.'UTORY DUTY OF A. DRIVER .OPERATING A VEHI-
CLE. TO -THE -LEFT' OF .THE: CEN'TER. OF THE HIGHWAY 
IN OVERTAKING AND -~PASSING ANOTHER VEHICLE 
TRAVELING IN THE S,AME DIRE,CTION. 
D~fendant subnutted two lengthy instructions, De-
·re~dant'·s request No. 13 and No. 14, detailing Plaintiff's 
·duty to stay on his own 1Side of the road, and Plaintiffs 
submitted instructions as to Defendant's.-s-ame duty. The 
Oourt·framed instructions relating to each driver's duty 
in this ·regard, Instruction No. 10, Instruction 11 at Part 
(e), ;and Instruction 14. 
Instruction No. 10: Section 57-7-121, Utah 
Code, 1943, which was in effect at the time of the 
accident involved in this ·case, provides as follows : 
"Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite direc-
tions shall pass each other to the right, ·and upon 
roadways having width for not more than one 
lane of traffic in each direction, drivers shall give 
to the~ther at least one-half of the main traveling 
portion of the roadway as nearly as possible." 
· · Instruction No. 11: It was the duty of the 
plaintiff and the defendant each to use reasonable 
care tiilder the' 'circumstances in driving his auto-
mobile to'avoid danger to himself and· others and 
and to observe and to be aware of the conditions 
of the highway, the traffic thereon, and to observe 
due care -in respect to ". . . (c) t'o drive his auto~ 
mobile on his own right side of the highway .... " 
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Instruction No. 14: You are instructed by the 
statutes of Utah that no vehicle shall at ·any time 
be driven to the left side of the roadway when 
approaching the crest u.f a grade, or upon a curve 
in ·the highway where the driver's vie·w is ob-
structed with such distance, as to create a hazard 
in the ervent another vehicle might approach from 
the opposite direction, and when the view is ob-
structed upon approaching within 100 feet of any 
bridge, if you find from the preponderance of the 
evidence in this case that Harry Walte~rs drove fo 
the· left of the center o.f the roadway upon ap-
proaching the crest o:f a grade or upon a curve 
in the highway ;and where his view was obstructed 
within such a diS'tance .as to create a hazard, when 
the automobile driven by Mrs. Pelly was ap-
proaching from the opposite direction, then Harry 
·Walters was negligent, and if -you find his negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the collision, 
you musrt return a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant and against the plaintiffs, No· Cause of 
Action. 
With the. foregoing, especially the command in In-
struction 14 th;at "If -you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence in this case thart Harry Walters drove the 
left of the eerrter o:f the roadway ... as to create a hazard 
when the automobile driven by Mrs. Pelly was approach-
ing from the opposite direction, then Harry Walters was 
negligent, and if you find his negligence was . the proxi-
mate cause of the collision you must return a verdict in 
favor of the defendant and .against the plaintiffs, No 
Gause of .Act:i!on" it does not seem Defendant needed the 
request No. 13 and No. 14, nor that the jurors needed 
s.ueh in. order to fairly and intelligently weigh the evi-
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dence. Certainly as to Plaintiff Betty Walters and her 
·c.ause of action Defendant was not . treated unf.airly by 
these instructions. 
Beckstrom vs. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P. 2d 
309, cited by Defendant in his Brief, rules error, a}ong 
with other items, for failure of the court to submit De-
fendant's last clear chance theory. We have no quarrel 
with the ruling of law therein. 
Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834, 
also cited by Defendant, is a case where plaintiff sues the 
executor for services to the deceased. It rules correctly 
that a party is entitled to have his theory covered, but 
rules that general coverage only is necessary, the court 
saying, with regard to the general instrnctions given re-
lating to defendant's theory of the case ·and certain cau-
tionary instructions : " ... the instructions should not be 
susceptible of misconstruction as either comments on 
the evidence or ·arguments for either side of the case .... 
It was the duty of the court to cover the theories of both 
parties in his instructions. . . . If the instructions are 
considered as a whole, as they must be, . . the court 
adequately discharged this duty and fairly presented the 
issues to the jury .... " 
The coU!rt further said in that case·: 
"We must keep uppermost in mind the pro-
vision orf our 'Statute, Section 104-14-7, U. C. A. 
1943 'the ~ourt must . . . disregard any error ... 
which does not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties, and no judgment shaH be reversed 
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See Rule 61, U. R. C. P. to the same effect. Before 
the appellant is entitled to prevail, he must show 
both error and prejudice ; that is, that his su~ 
stantial rights are affected .and that there is at 
least a fair likelihood that the result would have 
been different .... " 
Section 104-14-7, U. C. A. 1943, has been replaced 
by Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which read·s 
as follows: 
No error in either the admission or the ex-
clusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or ·order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground 
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing 
a judgment or -order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. The court at every stage o~ the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties. (Compiler's Notes. This 
Rule is based on former sections. 104-14-7 :and 
104-39-:-3 (Code 1943) both of which were repealed 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, Art. 3. The first ~f the 
forme;:r sections related· to error in any ·stage of 
the proceedings, while the latter former section 
related to consideration of error on appe:a~l.) 
Instruction No. 14 .as given may be open to the 
eriticism of not including all of the propositions and 
possibilities eovered in D·efendant's requests N~o. 13. and 
No.14. In this regard, a headnote from Morgan vs. Mam-
moth Mining Company, 26 Utah 174, 72 P. 688, is per-
tinent and reads as follows : 
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· Where a charge, considered as a whole, states 
law .applicable. to case 'fairly an~ correctly, fact 
4h~t 'One paragraph of charge, abstractly con-
., · ' sidered, does not stt;l.te law with absolute precision 
i'! · -·doe-s ·not ·constitute 'rever_sible error. · 
. 'i. A: headnote from In re Richards' Est.ate, 5 Utah 2d 
106, 297 P. 2d 542, annotated under Rule 61, Utah Rules 
&f·Civil Procedure, is als'o relevant. It rea·ds: · ,. ! '· --
Refusal. to give an instruction cannot be the 
basis for reversal -unless the jury was insuffi-
ciently advised of the issue they wer.e to deter-
mine, or it appears that they would have been 
confused or misled to the prejudice of the person 
complaining thereof. 
- Certainly-Btartin vs. Madsen does not rule that the 
statute, there the_ Dead Man's Statute, need be read to 
the jucy. While in a proper case the statute may be and 
should be read; tp.e practice:may as weill be error :~s ruled 
in Shields vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 
105 P. 2d 347. It is more general to refer to _the law 
or rule as encompassed by the statute such as contem-
p:~ated in JIFU No. _80.16, and prefacing such statutory 
or 'Q:fdinance rules with such language as "The Federal 
S~fety Appliance Act required that . . ., or ·provides 
that ... -or impo-ses .... " Here numerous statutory rules 
were involved but co;vered by the general instructions, 
i:e. lookout, "control, road conditions, Instrnction No. 9; 
passiig to the right, yielding half of road to other· car, 
mstructio,if' No. --10; reasonable· care, control, right side 
of highwaf; speed1 Instruction No. 11; left side. of road' 
where driver's view obstructed, Within one· hundred feet 
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of bridge, approaching crest of hill, "when the auto 
driven by Mrs. Pelly approaching from the opposite di-
rection ... ," Instruction No. 14; each or more of which 
items might have been, but need not be, co:vered by read-
ing a seciion of the Utah Code. Paragraph 1, Reid's 
Bransons Instructions to Juries, Article 100, Page 289, 
reads: 
·:I. 
"In most cases it is not deemed improper for 
the court to read or quote the pertinent statute. 
In ·some .cases mere quotation is insufficient. An 
instruction on alleged negligence in violation 9f 
a statute shou1d tell a jurywhat conduct amounts 
to such violation and not merely quote the ·statute. 
" 
and at Page 291: "At least one court .has already de-
clared that the court c:an substitute language of its own 
choosing equivalent to the terms of tl1.e stature." .C~.ting 
Morris: vs. Fizw.ater, 187 Oregon 191,. 210 P. 2d 104 
(rear-end auto collision case), which case in turn cites 
a sauthority Haag vs. Washilngton and Oregon Corporai-
tion, Oregm:t 144 P. 57 4, whe·re the court in commenting 
on the lengthy reading of the employer's liability act 
said: 
"Reading the law, at length to -the jury was 
likely to involve it in a determinati9n of questions 
not relating directly to the issues.'' _ _ .. 
Ramdall' s I nstr~ctions to Juries, Art. 409~ reads as fol,. 
lows: 
" ... In~tructions which corre·ctly set .forth a 
rule of law embodied in a statute are not erron-
eous because they do not use the exact language." 
(Citing seiVeral cases) 
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POINT III 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT III, i.e .. THAT ·THE 
TRIAL QOUR;T ERREP IN SUBMIT'TlNG TO THE JURY 
TliE. QUES.TION OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED AS .. NEGLI-
QENQE. " 
- The Court did instruct the jury, Instruc:tion No. 11, 
that it was the· duty of, not just the Defendant, -as indi-
cated ~n Appellant's Brief, Page 25, Paragraph 2, but 
"the duty of the· Plaintiff and the Defendant ... " to use 
reasonable care . . . with respect to speed, that is 4'to 
drive ~a_.t su~h ~peed as was safe, reasonable, and prudent 
under the circumstances having due regard to· the_ width, 
surface, and condition 10.f the highway, the traffic thereon, 
th~ .visibility- and any arctual or potential hazards. then 
existing." We know from the record that some of these 
pote~tial hazards included the rise in the highway, the 
curve ill the rhad, the bridge, the growth of vegetati9n 
along the highway, and the oncoming traffic. The speed 
limit ~ould. not neces~arily be such speed as was· "safe, 
reasonable, and prudent under the circumstances." T~e 
evidence, however, includes evidence of excessive speed, 
.and· s·ome ;of which evidence could be interpreted by the 
jury as evidence of speed in excess of the limit, that is, 
siXty miles per hour, and all of which is evidence -~£ speed 
e.x:~s~iv~ for the conditions.· The evidence is that the 
Pelly vehicle had passed an· automobile~ that of A. verett 
proceeding ·around fifty miles per hour and de·p:arted 
from ·the ·same by appro·ximately a mile at one time. 
Averett lla<Ltold the officer he was ~oling the maximum 
when passed by the Pelly automobile·~ (R-201, Line 126) 
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The evidence as a whole indicates that the Pelly vehicle, 
when it struak the shoulder of the road, ·as testified to 
by Averett "veered sharpJy off the road so the wheels 
got ·off the shoulder there ·and it made a sharp turn· and 
shot across the bridge." Betty Walters testified that 
the Pelly c.ar "weaved" (R-51, Line 1) and caused dust 
to fly (R-47, 48). The Pelly vehicle tire marks furthe~r 
indicated that vehicle was out of C'Ontrol. The jury coufd 
conclude under the circumstances that this was a result 
of excessive speed. The speed of the Pelly vehicle was 
such that the Walters vehicle, itself traveling forty-five 
miles per hour (R-108, Line 21), was knocked backward 
ten fee.f "(-R-188, Line 7). The photographs are further 
evidence of the amount of speed involved, and the jury 
could make certain legitimate inferences therefrom. 
In Hunter vs. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198 P. 2d 
245, cited by Appellant, the court correctly ruled that 
submission of speed was erroneous, but this was because 
of la.ck of evidence and in f'act where all the . evidence 
on the question was of moderate speed the court saying: 
"The appellant cites as prejudicial the giving 
of such instruction for the reas•on that there was 
not eviderwe adduced to the effect that her car was 
being operated at an excessive or unreasonable 
rate of speed, or in violation of the cited statute. 
She points out that plaintiff offered no competent 
evidence of any excessive speed, that she in f'act 
testified that she did not !know how fast defend-
ant's car ·was traveling. Defendant testified that 
she w.as going less than 25 niiles per hour, and the 
officer testified that at the ·point where the brakes 
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w~.re applied, the speed was from. 20 to 22 miles 
pe:r hour. 
. ·\ "The evid~nce shows that there were relatiyely 
few cars ·on the street at that time of night, anq 
there was· no evj.dence of any pedestrian traffic 
, ,c:rq~sing· the. str~et other than pJ~tiff. ~here 
being .a post~d speed .limit of 25 mile~ pe~ hour, 
no' . evidence was presented to show ~hat at . tp.a~ 
time the traffic was heavy enough to require a 
lesser speed .to be reasonable. There :is lacking 
ail.y evidence which would show that a speed of 
20 to 25 miles per hour. w.as excessive or unrea-
son~ble. We ·think the evidence not such as ·to 
· justify giving an instruction· ·on the spe~¢! of de-
fendant's ·car~ The evidence clearly indicates that 
the negligence of defenant, if any, wa8 ~failing 
to lreep such a lookout ahead as to see plaintiff in 
time to have avoided striking her." 
·· Itjs diff~~ult to see how the general language in the 
instructions with respect to speed could be prejudicial, 
even· if the· C!()futt -accepts Appellant's view that the same 
was' error. In Hunt V's. P .. J. Moran, Inc~, 46 Utah 388, 
15p P. 953, the Court pointed out that an instruction, 
th!o-ugh.- not founded upon issues and proof, is not ground 
for~ reversal if ~nonprejudicial. 
··I A viewing by the. jury of the scene o.f the accident, 
and the photographs, together with hearing the ·evidence 
~esp~ting tire marks, etc., ought· to entitle the jury to 
d.r~w' .·oo~ai~ conclusions with respect to the speed of 
the.Pelly. vehicle. 
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POINT IV 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT IV, i.e. THAT THE 
COURT ERRED IN: RE'FUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7, WHICH 
INSTRUCTION ENOOMP ASSED THE DEFENDANT'S 
THEORY OF THE CASE TH.A:T THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PLAINTIFF CREATED AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, AND 
WHICH THEORY WAS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 7 was: 
If you find from the evidence in this case, that 
Harry Walters was driving on the left side of the 
highway as the car driven by Harry Walters and 
Mrs. Pelly approached each other, and if this 
driving on the left side of· the highway by Harry 
W altei·s resulted in an emergency, which caused 
Mrs. Pelly to turn to the left and resulted in the 
collision, that said turning to . the· left side o;f the 
highway by Mrs. Pelly would not constitute negli-
gence on her part, and she would not he negligent 
for turning to the left, if the turning was a result 
·of the hazard created-by Harry Walters~ 
We submit this instruction as requested was in-
complete -and if given should be interpolated with lan·-
guage concerning the reasonable man test as modified 
by the alleged sudden peril and reduced accountability 
allowed because thereof. 
Three cases cited by. Defendant in his Brief, M orri-
s on vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pac. 2d 772; Beckstrom 
vs. Williams, 282 P. 2d 309, 3 Utah 2d 210; and Startin 
vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834, as they relate 
to Defendant's contention regarding the theory of his 
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case, we have commented on in this Brief heretofore 
under Point No. I and Point No. II. 
After the Court instructed the jury as to the duty 
of both drivers with respect to vigilance, road conditions, 
control, .ability to. sto-p, the prudent driver te:st (Instruc-
tion No. 9); duty to drive to the right,· leaving the 'Other 
half of the road open (Instruction No. 10); reasonable 
care, duty to observe, lookout, speed (Instruction No. 
11); the Court, Instruction No.14, detailed that if "Harry 
Walters drove to the left of the center of the roadway 
... within such a distance as to cre·ate a hazard, when 
the auto driven by Mrs. Pelly was approaching from the 
opposite direction, then Harry Walters was negligent, 
and if you find his negligence was the proximate cause 
of. the collision you must return a verdict in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiffs, No Cause of 
Action." 
This was followed with a sentence, Instruction No. 
15, Defendant's request No. 5, diluting the impact as 
against D·efendant of the fact of an accident, and then 
followed with Instruction 15 (a) on "unexpectedly con-
fronted with peril arising from either the actual presence 
·ot·the appearance of imminent danger .... " 
Can anyone really doubt that the jury knew De-
fendant contended Plaintiff Harry Walters "drove to the 
left of the center ... ," "as to create a hazard ... " and 
thai· Defendant was '' ... unexpectedly confronted with 
peril. ... " (quoted verbatim from Instructions 14 and 
15 (a) Y 
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As to Plaintiff Betty Walters; Instructi:on No 14 
was, in fact, heavily weighted in favor of Defendant, if 
we are correC!t that she was not capable of contributory 
negligence. 
POINT V 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT V i.e. THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 1TO GIVE DE'FEND-
ANT'.S REQUESTED INST·RUCTION NO. 3, WHICH IN-
STRUCTION SET FORTH THE STATUTORY RULE AS TO 
THE NATURE.: OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED WHEN THE 
TORT FE.AJSOR IS DEAD. 
D.efendant's requested Instruction No. 3 as submitted 
re.ads as f oHOlWs : 
The plaintiffs, Harry W·aJ.ters and Betty 
Walters, cannot recover judgment against the 
estate of Barbara Best Pelly except upon some 
competent satisfactory evidence other than their 
own testimony. The pJaintiffs, H-arry Walters 
and Betty Walters, have the burden of proving, 
by some other competent s~tisfactory evidence, 
other than their own testimony,_ that Barbara Best 
Pelly wrus negligent in one or more of the· par-
ticulars set forth in these instructions ·and that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of their 
injury and damage, if any. If plaintiffs have not 
proved b~ some other competent evidence, o~her 
than their own testimony, that Barbara Best Pelly 
was negligent, as set forth in the instructions, and 
that such negligence, if any, was a proximate 
cause . of the collision, then plaintiffs cannot. re-
cover and your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiffs, No Cause 
of Action. 
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The refusal to give this instruction was simply and 
~o~rec~y a ruling as a matter of law by the Court that 
there was other competent evidence other than the Plain-
tiff's own testimony. The physical evidence placed the 
Pelly vehicle on its wrong side of the road - could rea-
sonable minds differ as to the existence of "competent 
satisfactory evidence." 
The case, Fretz vs. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P. 
2d 642, cited by Defendant in his Brief as authority· for 
alleged error in not submitting the instruction in ques:. 
tion does not say nor indicate that such an instruction 
should be given. This case apparently concedes, as we 
contend, that the statute in question, 78-11-12, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, forces Plaintiff to prove his case by 
evidence other than his own testimony, an~ on failure 
t<>- so do suffer a ruling .as a matter of law by the Court 
of nonsuit. Plaintiffs Harry Walters and Betty Walters 
apparently proved their case adequately and almost 
wholly by "evidence other than the testimony of said 
injured pel'lsons," since they were precluded by applica-
tion of the Dead Man Statute to this accident from testi-
fying at all as to the actual accident, the same deemed 
by~he 00fUI't a "transaction equally within the knowledge 
of. the witness and the deceased" under the Dead Man 
Statute . 
. ·Traditionally, would not the question of whether 
there was "some competent satisfactory evidence other 
than the testimony o;f said injured person," be one for 
the Court and not the jury~ 
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Other cases touching on the sa.~d statute, 78-11-1~, 
Utah 'Code Annotated, 1953, are also not authority for 
the alleged error. Meads vs. Dibblee, 10 Utah 2d 229, 
350 P. 2d 853; ULR, Volume 7, Page 362; Meacham vs. 
Allen, v Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285. In that case, the Court 
in dealing with a presumption said: "The question of 
whether a prima facie case has been made is the same 
here as in all other c:ases a questi~on for the court and 
not for the jury to determine." In the instant ~ase, if 
Plaintiffs had not survived the evidentiary obstacle in 
78-11-12, they would have failed to make a prima facie 
case and the issues thus earlier resolved. 
~Furthermore, once the Oorurt by invoicing the 
Dead Man Statute limited the evidence by Plaintiffs of 
the accident to evidence other than their own testimony, 
would it not have been error to let the jury speculate on 
whether ·such evidence was either "competent" or "satis-
f.aetory" or "other than the tesimony of said injured 
person." At le:ast ~such ruling on the applicability of the 
Dead Man Statute made such instruction, Defendant's 
request No. 3, unnecessary and superfluous if not error. 
POINT VI 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT VI, i.e. THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING REPETITIOUS IN-
STRUCTIONS WHICH PREJUDICIALLY EMPHASIZED 
PLAINTIFF'S 'THEORY OF RECOVERY IN THE CASE. 
Defendant eontends Instruction 1, explaining Plain-
tiff's claim, Instruction No. 11 concerning the duties of 
both Plaintiffs and Defendant, and Instruction No. 17 
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which was a combination damage and "if you :find" in-
struction overemphasized Plaintiff~s' claim. 
If we concede that the rules of the road are ,appro:xi-
mately the same as they relate to each of the two autos 
approaching head-on, how can it be said that Instruction 
No. 11, commencing "It was the duty o.f the Plaintiff and 
Defendant each to ... " and ending "Failure of the Plain-
tiff or the Defendant ... " .as in Plaintiff's favor~ 
Regarding Instruction No 1, the Court could do little 
else but instruct on Plaintiffs' claim in order to detail 
what i~·sues had been raised by the pleadings, and the 
instruction covers the issues raised in the ple1adings by 
bo·th parties ·although Defendant in his Brief, Page 31, 
sets out only part of this instruction. Reid's Bransons 
Instrwctions to Juries, Volume 1, Page 285, reads: 
" ... it is not error to incorporate a short concise state-
ment of a party's position as found in the pleadings," 
citing among other c,ases Taylor vs. Weber County, 4 
Utah 2d 328, 293 P. 2d 925, which case in turn cites 
Brwner vs. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 649, and 
the statement therein, "There is nothing inherently erron-
eous in reading the pleadings in order to present the 
issue .... " D.avis vs. Heifner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 5B7, 
holds in general that the stating of issue.s by the trial 
court to the jury in language of the pleadings instead 
of giving a concise statement in its own language is not 
prejudicial e·rror where the issues were simple and not 
involved. Regarding Instruction No. 17, the s.ame· see1ns 
necesS'ary in order to let the jury ~mow when and how 
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Plaintiffs shoruld make out such 1ssues, if at all The 
necessity ·of such an instruction is apparent. The pro-
priety of tllis particular one is discussed under Point No. 
I. 
Shields vs. Utah Light & Traction Company, 99 Utah 
307, 105 P. 2d 347, cited by Defendant, is hardly helpful. 
rrhere the trial court read in its instructions pleadings 
comprising ". . . ten printed pages of the abstract.", 
Page 309, " •.. portions of the eity or.dinance to be Tead 
to the jury as well .as certain identical sections of the 
statute in addition to having the court (further on in the 
instruction) repeat these laws in substance- togelther with 
an explanation of just how these propositions were to 
be applied to the facts," Page 313 The repetition was 
held to be _unnecessary and was gross, and even then 
only deemed prejudicial error when weighed with several 
other apparently substantial errors. In De.Vine vs. Cook, 
3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P. 2d 1073 (1955) cited by Defendant, 
the court found "It was error to instruct the jury on an 
issue of contributory negligence of certain_ plaintiffs 
(~rs. Gusinda and lVlr,s. DeVine)," that "the court's in-
structions regarding contributory negligence were ep.·on~ 
eous ·and prejudiGial," that "the trial court co_ffi.I¢tted 
error in refusing to grant the motion of the defendant, 
W. S. !-latch Company, for a directed. v-erdict." . The 
Supreme Court detailed the. innocuous nature of instruc-
tions 5, 7, 8, .and 9, in eonjunctio:J?- with instructio_ns 1 to 
4, saying "It can readily be seen that the instructions 
accentuated the duty ·oif the plaintiffs and mini:ri4zed the 
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duty of the defendants." In re,ading s.aid instructions, 
we have no quarrel with the decision and agree with the 
criticisms and the principles laid down therein, but fail 
to find an analogy to the instructions being considered 
here. 
Considering the dual nature of Instruction No. 1 
(part :om.ly set out in Defendant's Brief), an!d the dual 
nature.of Instruction No. 11 defining the duties of head-
on drivers having similar duties, we are re:aJ.ly only eon-
fronted With the propriety of Instruction No. 17 earlier 
dis·c:ussed. As noted earlier, th.at instruction, Instruction 
No.17, may he open to criticism, though we believe not of 
a prejudicial nature, as to Plaintiff Harry W·alters, but 
certainly not as to Plaintiff Betty .Walters. 
CONCLUSION 
Instructions in any case in the clear vision of hind-
sight can be improved. Trial exigencies usually leave 
inadequate time for perfection in composition. Lengthy, 
unnecessary, and duplicitous requests further encroach 
on the Court's time. Failure of counsel to insist, even 
where objections are reserved until after the jury retires, 
on instructions deemed important, may amount to per-
missive error. All things considered, however, the one 
most qualified to instruct the jury, and to determine later 
if a new trial should be had, in light of the problems 
there at hand and having heard and seen a;s well as re:ad 
the testimony of the witne1sses, is, and is presumed to be, 
the trial judge. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
The contentions of both sides were in plain English 
made clear; the claim of Defendant of emergency was 
forcefully put and could not have been misunderstood. 
Instruction No. 17 is correct as to the passenger, Plaintiff 
Betty Walters, and not prejudicial as to the driver, 
H.arry Walters. Speed was a legitimate area otf instruc-
tion. Competent eyidence other· than from Plaintiffs' 
testimony did as a matter of law ~ot only. exist b~t is 
conceded. (Appellant's Brief, Page 10, Paragraph 1). 
M:atters were fully aired, the jury fully and· .fairly .ap~ 
prised, and Defendant had a fair trial. 
· Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLE D·E:AN HUNT · 
Continental Bank Building 
.Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Resppndents . 
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